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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL SHIFT TOWARD DEMOCRACY: MEXICO CITY'S
AMENDMENT TO GRANT ELECTIONS GIVES RISE TO A NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Mexico City's mayoral election in July of 1997 marked a
historical event for the world's largest capital city and the Mexican
state. 1 This election ended the long-established tradition of the
Mexican President appointing the mayor of Mexico City, dating
back to 1928.2 For the first time in Mexico's modern history, the
country's ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
relinquished its control over Mexico City's mayor.3 The residents
of Mexico City elected opposition party candidate Cuauhtemoc
Cirdenas of the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) as their
mayor.4 After years of demanding change in the political structure
of Mexico City, Mexicans finally had the opportunity to go to the
polls and cast their vote for mayor.
Traditionally, the constitutional amendment process in
Mexico was viewed as a political forum for the President to protect
his powers. The recent reform in Mexico City, however, reflects a
new constitutional order, which suggests that the opposition can
legitimize democratic reform. Mexicans can seek democracy by
exerting pressures on the ruling party and *by amending the
Constitution.

1. See Carlos Fuentes, Can democracy finally take root? Dawn in Mexico, WORLD
PRESS REVIEW, Sept. 1997, at 6.
2. See Mark Fineman, Mexicans Ready to Test New Voice at the Polls Election: They
will pick capital'smayor, fill state andfederal seats in today's vote. Opposition is expected
to gain., L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at Al.
3. See Dudley Althaus, Mexico enters new way of life: Democracy taking shape in
wake of PRI defeats, HOUS. CHRON., July 8, 1997, at 1, availablein 1997 WL 6565806.
4. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico City's Mayor Sworn in Amid Cheers., L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at Al.
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This Comment analyzes constitutional change through the
experiences of both the United States and Mexico. This Comment
also discusses how a major constitutional reform will impact
Mexico's attempt to democratize. Part II explores the significance
of constitutions, as well as the process of constitutional
amendment in the United States and Mexico. Reference is made
to constitutional change theories that should enlighten one's
understanding of the reform in Mexico City. Part III discusses the
process of reform under several constitutional change theories.
Part IV explores the future of democracy in Mexico and envisions
a new constitutional order. Finally, this Comment concludes that
Mexico's recent constitutional amendment in response to
pressures from the Mexican people legitimizes democratic reform
in Mexico.
II. THEORIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS
A constitution provides protection for individual rights and a
guideline of the government's structure and powers. 5 It also
establishes the rights and powers existing between the sovereign
and its people. 6 The Bar6n de Montesquieu observed that society
must change with the times to avoid ill-conceived actions by the
government. 7 Constitutions may be challenged despite their legal
validity and formal provisions. To deal with challenges, a
constitution may add mechanisms for amendments as endorsed by
the people. 8 Constitutional amendments may be minimal or
radical. For example, changing a single article or changing the
meaning of an existing provision may constitute an amendment.
The consequences of radical constitutional change, however, may
undermine governmental stability.
A. ConstitutionalAmendment Process in the United States
During the United States Constitutional Convention of 1776,
9
the framers debated the necessity of an amending process.
Legislators such as George Mason of Virginia argued that because
5. See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ITS AMENDMENTS 24 (1997).
6. See id.

7. See JOHN R.

VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN

POLITICAL THOUGHT

8. See id. at 12.
9. See id. at 26.

13 (1992) [hereinafter

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS].
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the Articles of Confederation failed to adapt to changes, any new
constitution would surely require an amending process. 10 An
amending process is built to eliminate potential defects and to
"provide a mechanism for constitutional change as opposed to
revolutionary change."11 Therefore, an amendment provision
would be an inherently peaceful resolution to changing or
modifying written law.
Thomas Jefferson argued that citizens had the right to alter
written constitutions when such documents failed to secure a
working government or when they denied them their individual
rights. 12 Delegates to the Constitutional Convention rejected a
number of proposed amendment provisions. 13 By the end of the
Convention, however, the delegates created the provision now
found in Article V of the
U.S. Constitution that allows for
14
amendments.
constitutional
Since its adoption in 1789, the U.S. Constitution has been
amended only 27 times. 15 Over 9000 constitutional amendments
between 1789 and 1989, however, have been introduced in
Congress. 16 Many reasons exist as to the implementation of only a
few amendments to the Constitution.
For example, the
requirements of "extraordinary majorities in both legislative
houses" and "ratification requirements' 17 are difficult to satisfy.

10. See iL at 27.
11. Seeid.at3l.
12. See id at 62.
13. See id at 31.
14. U.S. CONST. art. V. provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
15. See U.S. CONST.
16. See Gerald Benjamin & Tom Gais, ConstitutionalConventionphobia,1 HOFSTRA
L. & POL'Y SYMP. 53, 56 (1996).
17. See id.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 21:131

1. Bruce Ackerman's Theory: Higher Lawmaking
Bruce Ackerman, a constitutional scholar, provides a deeper
understanding of the U.S. Constitutional amendment process.
Ackerman's theory of the amendment process begins with what he
18
refers to as a "higher lawmaking" or "constitutional politics."
New regimes or changing political stages initiate proposals for
constitutional amendments. 19 Ackerman identifies the drafting of
the U.S. Constitution, the Civil War, and the New Deal as three
primary regimes that used the formal Article V amending process
to bring about political change. 20 In addition to following the
formal constitutional amending clause, the majority of proposed
amendments must follow a "discrete series of stages" 21 to
determine whether an amendment should be enacted.
"During periods of constitutional politics, the higher
lawmaking system encourages the engaged citizenry to focus on
the fundamental issues and determine whether any of the
proposed solutions can gain the considered support, and therefore
22
the accompanying political legitimacy, of a mobilized majority."
A constitutional amendment is, therefore, not necessary if a
constitutional period follows the stages of (1) a signaling phase, (2)
a proposal stage, (3) a period of mobilized popular deliberation,
and (4) legal codification. 23 Thus, when a proposed law affects the
meaning of the Constitution, there is no need to enact a valid
amendment as required by Article V.24 Rather, changes are
initiated by the will of the people through legislative and judicial
means. 25 Any change to the constitution's foundational principles
by the political elite (e.g., the government) must be revised
26
through constitutional means.

18. See JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 76 (1994) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES].

19.
20.
21.
22.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 77.
Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

1995).
23.
24.
25.
26.

66 (Sanford Levinson ed.,

See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18 at 77.
See Ackerman, supra note 22, at 72.
See id.
See id. at 66.
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2. John Vile's Theory on Court Interpretation
While much of the structure of the Constitution has remained
untouched, its meaning has gradually changed over time. Vile
focuses on how changes to the U.S. Constitution occur through
court interpretation. 27 In Marbury v. Madison28, the Supreme
Court concluded that it had the power to interpret the
Constitution. 29 Often times, the Supreme Court will issue a
decision that interprets the meaning of specific Constitutional
terms. "The beauty of judicial review is not simply that it can
provide a means of giving authoritative interpretation of the
Constitution but also that it can overcome the rigidity seemingly
inherent in the unchanging words of the Constitutional text."-30
While the Supreme Court's primary function is to interpret the
Constitution, the Court's role is more expansive.
By following various modes of interpretation, 31 Vile notes
that the Supreme Court implicitly amends the Constitution with
every significant decision designed to preserve the status quo,
reverse prior decisions, sanction change, and initiate drastic
change. 32 For example, when the Court overturned the doctrine of
"separate but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education,33 the Court
indirectly expanded the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect all individuals regardless of race. 34 Hence, by altering the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause,
35
the Supreme Court effectively changed the Constitution.
Indeed, this important decision demonstrates the significant role
the Supreme Court plays in the amending process of the U.S.
Constitution.
Perhaps because Article V establishes the difficulty of formal
amending, judicial decisions perform the role of both initiating and
codifying legal change with increasingly less difficulty. 3 6 In the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
textual
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 35.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
See id.
See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 35.
These modes of interpretations include a historical strict construction, a strict
construction followed by Justice Scalia, and a legalistic construction.
See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 36.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 42.
See id. at 41.
See id. at 86.
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Supreme Court, a majority decision requires at least five votes. 37
In contrast, a formal amendment proposed by Congress requires
not only a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate,
but the concurrence of three-fourths of the states.38 Although the
Constitution has been amended only twenty-seven times, "[o]ver
the last two centuries, the Supreme Court has rendered tens of
thousands of decisions." 39 In examining the Supreme Court's
history, the Court has had as much if not more influence on
changing the Constitution as has the legislature.
B. ConstitutionalAmendment Processin Mexico
The amendment process in Mexico is quite different from that
of the United States. Mexico's current constitution was drafted
following the Revolution of 1910.40 The delegates of the Mexican
Constitutional Congress of 1916-1917 relied upon two prior
Mexican Constitutions and the U.S. Constitution as models. In
order to avoid another revolution, the delegates decided to involve
the people who revolted in 1910, including the campesinos
(farmers and peasants), laborers and indigenous people. 41
Moreover, the delegates granted the power to the people to
change the Constitution through an amendment process. 42 Article
135 of the Mexican Constitution reads:
This Constitution may be amended or reformed. For these
amendments or reforms to become part of it, it is required that
the Congress of the Union, by the vote of two third parts of the
individuals present, agrees to the amendments or reforms, and
that these be approved by the majority of the legislatures of the
States. The Congress of the Union or the Permanent
Commission in its case, shall make the computation of the votes
of the legislatures and the declaration
that the amendments or
43
reforms have been approved.
Since its adoption in 1917, Mexico's Constitution has been
amended 350 times and 37 times in the past seven years alone. 44

37. See id
38. See U.S. CONST. art. V.

39. See
40.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 36.
See JORGE CARPIZO, LA CONSTITUCION MEXICANA DE 1917 5 (1997).

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 49.
See id. at 268.
MEX. CONST., art. 135 (1917).
See Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico's Legal Revolution: An Appraisal of its Recent
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Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which allows for implicit changes to
be made by judicial interpretation, Mexico's constitutional changes
are explicitly made by the President.45 The legislature, like the
judiciary system, is heavily influenced by a very powerful
President. 46 Two theories explain how the President of Mexico is
able to modify the Constitution so frequently within a six-year
term in office.
1. Jorge A. Vargas: Programmatic Content, The Document Itself
To explain the nature of constitutional amendment in Mexico,
Jorge Vargas offers an approach to illustrate the programmatic
content of the Constitution. The Mexican Constitution "carries
more legal and political importance, enshrines more of the history
of the nation and is vested with more solemnity than the
Fundamental Law of the Nation" than any other public document
in Mexico. 47 In addition to describing the federal powers and
individual guarantees, the Constitution embodies a principal factor
that led to the Mexican Revolution-"agrarian reform." 48 While
the working class may assert their protective rights using the
Constitution, the President asserts his power
by using his "political
49
platform" to publicize a six-year program.
Ever since President Lazaro Cdrdenas initiated his six-year
plan in the late 1930s, every President of Mexico has followed this
tradition 50 and constitutional practice.51 By announcing and
publishing his "National Development Plan," the President
carefully begins to assert his plan to implement changes to the
Constitution. 52 Thus,
[I]nserting a change in the Constitution as a result of an
initiative advanced by the Executive has been well-recognized
practice utilized in Mexico to send 'messages' to the other

ConstitutionalChanges,1988-1995, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497, 504 (1996).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 506.
47. See id. at 503.
48. Prior to the 1917 Revolution, most of the land in Mexico was owned by large
landowners and foreign companies. The Revolution was instigated not only for political
changes but also for land reform. Article 27 establishes the foundation of agrarian reform
creating the "ejido" system. MEX. CONST., art. 27.
49. See Vargas, supra note 44, at 503.
50. See id. at 503.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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federal powers, and to the States, without the Executive being
perceived as being overly intrusive, somewhat invading the
spheres of jurisdiction that correspond to the Legislature
and
53
the Judiciary, or to any of Mexico's thirty-one States.
This "well-recognized practice" explains the reasons why the
Mexican Constitution is frequently amended. In contrast to the
relatively stable U.S. Constitution, the Mexican Constitution is
generally changed every six years to reflect the President's
54
national plan.
2. Jaime F. Cirdenas Gracia: Presidentialism In Mexico
Another approach to understanding the constitutional
amendment process in Mexico is to refer to the concept and rules
of Mexico's presidencialismo (presidentialism). 55
Jaime F.
Cirdenas Gracia, a Mexican political scientist, documented how
the President of Mexico can easily alter the Constitution using his
56
powers and legacy.
The President's powers are broad and have few limitations. 57
The President derives his powers not only from the Constitution,
but also from the practices and characteristics of the Mexican
political system.58 The President builds a powerful political base
through the power of his party, enabling him to amend the
Constitution. 59 Jorge Carpizo, a Mexican constitutional scholar,
attributes this vast power to the President's control over the
military, 60 the Supreme Court, 61 the economy, 62 and the federal
states. 63
This Presidential power helps to explain the ease and
frequency with which Mexico's Constitution changes. 64 Because
of his great influence over the political actors involved with the

53. See id
54. See id.
55. See JAIME F. CARDENAs GRACIA, TRANSICION POLITICA Y REFORMA
CONSTrrUCIONAL EN MEXICO 70 (1994).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id at 90.
See CARPIZO, supra note 40, at 282.
See id. at 282-83.
See id. at 291.
See MEX. CONsT. art. 89, IV-VII.
Id. art. 94.
Id. art. 80.
Id. art. 90.
See Vargas, supra note 44, at 504.
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amendment process, the President may change the Constitution at
any time with the stroke of his pen. 65 Unlike the President of the
United States, the Mexican President is not checked or controlled
by Mexico's legislature because the majority of Mexico's Congress
typically belongs to the Mexican President's party. 66
By
controlling Congress, the President dominates the amendment
67
process and assures the continued power of the President's party.
Thus, the President of Mexico is both the author and protector of
the Mexican Constitution.
III. CASE STUDY: MEXICO CITY ELECTORAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT

Mexico City is the largest, most populous city on earth. 68 It is
home to more than one-fourth of the nation's population, and
serves as the seat of power in Mexico. 69 For some, Mexico City is
the guardian of culture and tradition. Yet for others, it is a
laboratory for the future of the Mexican state. What the future
holds for Mexico depends in large measure on the manageability
and governability of this megalopolis.
One of Mexico's distinguished writers, Octavio Paz,
summarized a common sentiment when he said, "the demographic,
political, economic, and cultural centralization has converted
Mexico City into a monstrous inflated head, crushing the frail body
that holds it up."' 70 Paz is correct. The economic and political
forces in Mexico City overwhelm the rest of the nation. In an
attempt to strengthen their power and continue their control,
Mexico's political leaders concentrated the government's power in
the capital which has enlarged the city's size and population to
mammoth proportions. Moreover, the centralization of power has
inhibited the emergence of a democratic local government.

65. See id.
at 507.
66. See id at 506.
67. See Javier Livas, Symposium:
Mexican Elections, Human Rights, and
International Law: Opposition Views-Perspective From the RighL NationalAction Party
(PAN), 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 373,375 (1994).
68. See MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 250 (1994).
69. See JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEXICO CITY 528
(1988).
70. See OCTAVIO PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 343 (1985).
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A. The Eliminationof Democracy in Mexico City
Democracy in Mexico City has been gradually eliminated.
Mexico's Constitution of 1824 established Mexico City as a federal
district with a decision making body and a governor. 71 The federal
district became the nation's administrative center, serving as the
site of cultural and political hegemony. 72 Leaders in Mexico
would soon became aware of the significance and importance of
Mexico City in terms of power and control. Although Mexico
City's governor was elected in 1824, the electoral process suffered
because of corruption and competition between the Liberals and
the Conservatives. 73 Many of Mexico's presidents during this era
were in office for brief periods of time because of assassinations
and coups. 74 Political factions fought to prevent each other from
75
governing the nation.
In 1857, under Benito Juarez's presidency, voters once again
elected the governor of Mexico City.76 His office, however, was
short-lived. 77 In 1884, Porfirio Dfaz became the President of
Mexico for the second time and political centralization rapidly
emerged. 78 President Dfaz's political maneuvering eliminated
local democratic practices in the capital and replaced them with a
system that put Dfaz at the pinnacle of Mexico City's political
79
structure.
Following the overthrow of Dfaz, Francisco I. Madero
assumed the Mexican presidency in 1910.80 He demonstrated a
commitment to democratic politics for Mexico City. 81 For the first
time since Dfaz eliminated all democratic practices in Mexico City,
the federal government promised the capital's citizens free

71. See MEX. CONST. art. 157 (1824).
72. See Jost R. CASTELAZO, CIUDAD DE Mtxico: REFORMA POSIBLE [Mexico
City: Reform Possible] 20 (1992).
73. See DONALD FITHIAN STEVENS, ORIGINS OF INSTABILITY IN EARLY
REPUBLICAN MEXICO 20 (1991).
74. See id. at 59.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See Lorenzo Meyer, Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico, in
AUTHORITARIANISM IN MEXICO 5 (Jose Luis Reyna & Richard S. Weinert eds., 1977).
77. See id
78. See id.
79. See id
80. See DIANE E. DAVIS, URBAN LEVIATHAN: MEXICO CITY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 28 (1994).
81. See id at 29.
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elections. 82 Madero's hopes to reintroduce democratic elections in
Mexico City, however, were soon dashed by the Revolution of
1910.83 As Mexico fell into the hands of the revolutionary elite,
competing political parties and factions undermined any hopes for
a new democracy. 84 Following the Revolution, a new constitution
was drafted and ratified. 85 The Constitution of 1917 required the
President to appoint Mexico City's mayor. 86 By giving Mexico's
president this power, the federal government once again denied
the citizens of Mexico City the right to elect their own mayor. 87
B. Rebirth of Democracy: The PoliticalReform for Mexico City
In the decades following the elimination of open elections in
Mexico City, the ruling PRI ignored public demands for elected
representation in the capital. 88 Although the PRI made constant
changes in government organizations, they had no incentive to
reinstate a democratic structure in the capital.8 9 Over the years,
government officials and party members created a large and
centralized bureaucratic system tailored to the needs of the elite. 90
By controlling Mexico City's economic development, services,
and bureaucracy, the PRI was able to maintain control over the
entire nation. While the PRI centralized its power within the
political structure of the city, the citizens of Mexico City grew
increasingly frustrated with their inability to directly impact the
city's policies. 91 This frustration forced citizens to understand that
in order to seek change from the government, they had to
challenge the government's power.92 Although the Constitution
allows direct changes to the Constitution by the people under

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
appoint
id.
87.
88.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See KANDELL, supra note 69, at 436.
MEX. CONST., art. 122. This article provides the President with the power to
the mayor of the federal district (Mexico City) and the power to remove him. See
See DAVIS, supra note 80, at 55.
See JOE FOWERAKER, POPULAR MOBILIZATION IN MEXICO: THE TEACHERS'

MOVEMENT 1977-87 168 (1993).
89. See id.
90. See ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 55
(1989).
91. See ia
9Z See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 24244 (3rd ed. 1992).
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article 39, the people's lack
of representation did not pose a real
93
threat to the ruling party.
By the late 1960s, the PRI's traditional ways of political
94
activity came under fire from the increasingly frustrated society.
Many Mexicans became aware of the barriers that prevented them
from expressing their needs and participating in Mexico City's
decision-making process. 95 They realized how the PRI served and
benefited a small segment of Mexican society, while excluding
96
millions from political representation.
The student movement of 1968 marked the beginning of 97
a
Mexico.
within
democracy
of
future
the
over
inquiry
national
Although the PRI prevented the escalation of the political
challenge, the PRI's legitimacy and credibility was seriously
threatened for the first time since its founding. 98 Students joined
other sectors of Mexican society, such as the teacher's unions, to
demand the democratization of Mexico City.99 Protests and
marches followed. At that moment, however, the movement did
not generate enough popular support to undermine the PRI's
control or to institute political change. 100 Not until 1982, during
the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, did the citizens of
Mexico City and the federal government formally begin to discuss
constitutional reform for Mexico City.
L" Closer to Democracy: Attempts to Amend the Constitution
a. The Presidency of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
In 1982, when Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, a Harvardtrained economist, assumed the presidency to face an ailing
economy, a looming debt crisis, and a dissatisfied urban
population. 1 1 De la Madrid sought both economic and political
reform for Mexico and its capital. 10 2 During his campaign, he
93. See id.
94. See Jose Woldenberg, Challenges of the democratization process, VOICES OF
MEXICO, Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 7.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 92.
98. See FOWERAKER, supra note 88, at 2.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See TODARO, supra note 68, at 276.
102. See DAVIS, supra note 80, at 262.
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promised to restore democracy to Mexico City, as did his
predecessors. 103 Officials within his administration committed
themselves to implementing his proposed reforms and to finding
ways of gaining support from the public. 10 4 With hopes of reviving
the economy and also preventing the public from revolting against
the PRI, de la Madrid proposed a constitutional amendment
aimed at allowing the citizenry to elect the mayor of Mexico
City.10 5 By late 1982, de la Madrid and his cabinet started to
10 6
develop a plan for democratic reform in Mexico City.
De la Madrid's actions signified that Mexico City might once
10 7
again have direct elections for mayor and local representatives.
Conflicts within his own party, however, prevented him from
completely implementing the reform. 108 State and party leaders
became increasingly aware of the political ramifications of such
change. For example, Ramon Aguirre, de la Madrid's mayoral
appointee, rejected any constitutional amendment designed to
make his office an elected one.10 9 Aguirre wanted to maintain his
power over Mexico City and the support of the powerful private
and public sector lobbies. 110 Instead of moving forward with the
amendment, de la Madrid submitted to the pressures from his
111
party and his mayor, and withdrew his election plan.
b. The Presidency of CarlosSalinas de Gortari
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, de la Madrid's successor,
assumed the presidency in 1988 to face a rocky political scene. 112
In the Presidential elections of 1988, the PRI received a mere
forty-nine percent of the national electoral vote and only one out
of four votes in Mexico City. 113 Cuauhtemoc Cdrdenas Solorzano,
a presidential candidate for the Frente Democratico Nacional
103. See id. at 260.
104. See id. at 261.
105. See id.
106. See id at 262.
107. See Diane E. Davis, Failed Democratic Reform in Contemporary Mexico: From
Social Movements to the State and Back Again, 26 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 403, (1994).
108. See id.
109. See DAVIS, supra note 80, at 267.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 275.
112- See FOWERAKER, supra note 88, at 168.
113. See Peter M. Ward, Government Without Democracy in Mexico City: Defending
the High Ground, in MEXICO'S ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL FUTURES 311 (Wayne A.
Cornelius et al. eds., 1989).
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(FDN), (later called the PRD) accused the PRI of committing
electoral fraud. 114 "While the final results will always be disputed,
it is possible that Cdrdenas won the election by a narrow
margin."' 115
With these challenges, Salinas took office on
December 1, 1988.116
In order to gain legitimacy and support from the public,
Salinas promised to improve democracy in Mexico City and to
reform the electoral process nationwide. The opposition parties
responded by promoting the idea of establishing Mexico City as a
new state, called Estado de Andhuac. 117 As the thirty-second
state, Mexico City would directly elect its own governor and its
own Chamber of Deputies. 118 The governor would replace the
appointed mayor, and the Chamber would replace the
Assembly. 119 This proposed political project would essentially pry
the PRI from its control over Mexico City. Accordingly, President
120
Salinas and his administration would oppose this reform.
On March 21, 1993, the opposition parties and independent
groups took several questions to the people of Mexico City to seek
support for a constitutional amendment. 121 With the government's
permission, organizers asked three questions: (1) should Mexico
City become a state?; (2) should the Governor be elected by direct
122
vote?; and (3) should Mexico City have a local Congress?
Although only 331,180 of an expected one million voters
participated, 84.8 percent favored the election for a Governor, 84.3
percent supported the creation of a local Congress, and 66 percent
favored the idea of making Mexico City a state. 123 The plebiscite
124
represented a clear threat to the government.
Instead of accepting the results as the basis for a proposal,
Salinas proposed a more moderate amendment that would not
114. See id.
115.

MIGUEL ANGEL CENTENO, DEMOCRACY WITHIN REASON:

TECHNOCRATIC

REVOLUTION IN MEXICO 15 (2d ed. 1994).
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threaten his power nor that of his party. In April 1993, Salinas and
Mayor Manuel Camacho Solis, proposed the establishment of a
new form of government for Mexico City in 1997.125 The mayor
would be selected from the local legislatures of the majority party
in the Federal District's Assembly of Representatives. 126 Thus,
the Mexican president would still have the right to choose the
mayor from a list prepared by the majority party. Camacho
believed that the proposed amendment "consolidate [d]
representative democracy, recognize[d] the rights of local citizens,
the equilibrium with national political
and maintain[ed]
27
systems."1
The amendment, 128 although reasonable in theory, would still
give the PRI control in Mexico City.129 Nevertheless, "the
Mexican government-bowing to a democratic reform
movement-will allow a gradual shift from a federal to a local
government.' 130 This reform represented a symbolic gesture from
This gesture fell short of a
the PRI to its opposition.
Constitutional amendment because it went no further in granting
the residents of Mexico City the power to elect their mayor than
did de la Madrid's failed attempts.
2. A Democratic Reality: Zedillo's Constitutional Amendment
Given the many trials and failures of the reform movement
during the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations, it seemed
unlikely that any foundation for a political reform existed in
Mexico City in 1994. There were high hopes for Mexico's new
trade agreement with the United States and Canada. Yet, the
events that occurred in 1994 induced drastic changes in Mexican
political thought and action. "Economic disarray, official
corruption, an unresolved Indian uprising, and several unsolved
killings pushed Mexico to what some [in Mexico City] say is the
brink of the most serious crisis of state since the 1910
125. See David Clark Scott, Mexico City Mayor Steers Slow Course to Self-Rule But
Critics say reforms are political paternalism,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 22 1993, at
22, available.in 1993 WL 7152644.
126. See Jorge V. Alcocer, Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico: Prospectsfor a Real
Multiparty Democracy, in THE CHALLENGE OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN MEXICO 62
(Riordan Roett ed., 1995).
127. Scott, supra note 125, at 23.
128. MEX. CONST. art. 122(VI)(a).
129. See Scott, supra note 125, at 23.
130. Id.
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Revolution."' 131 For the first time since the end of the Mexican
Revolution of 1910, Mexico's political, social, and economic
132
stability were seriously threatened.
a. Events leadingto a ConstitutionalReform
From the winter of 1994 to the summer of 1995, the political
reform movement to elect the mayor of Mexico City moved closer
to reality. The first major event of 1994 was the Chiapas
uprising. 133 On January 1, 1994, between 1000 and 10,000
members of the Zapatista National Liberation Army took arms
and marched into San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, demanding
134
social development and democracy.
On March 23, 1994, after announcing his plan for political
reform to the people of Tijuana, Mexico, PRI's presidential
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated. 135 Colosio's
death ended sixty-five years of political stability, including the
PRI's smooth presidential transition and the beginning of political
transformation. 136 Those who feared the worst for Mexico's
fragile stability found those fears heightened by the events that
followed Colosio's death.
In September 1994, Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the PRI's Party
Leader was assassinated on the streets of Mexico City. 137 His
brother, Mario Ruiz Massieu, a close ally of former President
Salinas, was linked to Massieu's assassination and fled to the
United States where he was extradited for money laundering. 138
Months later, Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former President
Salinas, was arrested and charged with corruption and conspiracy
to kill Massieu. 139 These events symbolized the worst crisis the
131. Anthony DePalma, Mexico's Accidental Chief Spurns Role of Strongmen, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at Al.

132. See id.
133. See Juanita Darling, Mexican Revolt in 2nd Day; 65 Dead Latin America: Indians
continue to battle governmentforces, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See LAURA QUINTERO & IGNACIO RODGRIGUEZ, COLOSIO Y ZEDILLO POR LA
REFORMA DEL PODER? 13 (1994).

137. See Juanita Darling, Top Official of Mexico's Ruling Party Is Slain Assassination:
Francisco Ruiz Massieu's death is the latest incident in a mounting wave of violence, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 29 1994 at Al.
138. See id.
139. See Mark Fineman, Mexico Corpse Fails to Yield Clues Tests continue on body
found at Salinas ranch. Victim's identity crucial to assassinationprobe, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
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PRI faced since the student movements of the late 1960s.
In response to the economic crisis, tragedies, and social unrest
facing the nation, Mexicans went to the ballot boxes on August 21,
1994. That day, the people elected PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo
Ponce de Leon President of Mexico with less than half of the
votes. 140 In an election that witnessed an astonishingly high 77.73
percent voter turnout, Zedillo mustered 48.77 percent, while
Diego Fernandez de Cevallos of the Partido Acci6n Nacional
(PAN) and Cuauhtemoc Cdrdenas Solorzano
of the PRD received
14 1
25.94 and 16.65 percent, respectively.
The PAN earned even greater support outside of Mexico
City.
After the Presidential elections, the party won the
governorship of Jalisco and the mayorship of Guadalajara, the
state capital in 1995.142 In that same year, the PAN won the office
of governor for the state of Guanajuato, but lost the governorship
143
of Yucatan to the PRI in a close and arguably fraudulent race.
After 65 years of complete rule, the PRI conceded important
states to the opposition. These elections severely threatened the
PRI's authority.
By December 1994, with Mexico's peso severely devalued, the
rate- of inflation rose, unemployment grew, and Mexico's economy
was on the brink of fiscal collapse. 144 To halt this downward
spiral, President Zedillo turned to the U.S. Treasury and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan. 145 Many Mexicans
blamed the ruling party for their economic hardships. 146 The
tumultuous social, political, and economic climate of 1994 pushed
147
the reform movement to new levels.

20, 1996, at A5.
140. See Mark Fineman, Final Tallies Show Mexico's Long-Ruling PRI Maintaining Its
Hold On Near-Absolute Power, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,1994, at A14.
141. See id.
142. See Mark Fineman, Ruling PRI Suffers Crushing Defeat in Key Mexico State
Election: Opposition PAN heads for a major sweep in Jalisco,dealing president'sparty one
of its worst losses in 66 years. Wide margin eases fears of violent protests., L.A. TIMES, Feb.
14,1995, at 1.
143. See Mixed News From Mexico New blood in one state, a dinosaurin another, L.A.
TIMES, May. 31, 1995, at 6.
144. See Allan H. Meltzer, Clinton's Bailout Was No Favor to Mexicans, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 2,1996, at All.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Howard La Franchi, Peso Plunge ChallengeMexico's Democracy, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 1995, at 4.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 21:131

b. PresidentZedillo's Promisefor an ElectoralAmendment
The events of 1994 and 1995 indicated that political reform
and a subsequent constitutional amendment to elect the mayor of
Mexico City might be imminent. At the beginning of his term,
Zedillo emphasized political reform as a priority in his
administration because it was crucial to Mexico's recovery and
stability. 148 Many political analysts, however, remain skeptical of
Zedillo's commitment to political change. 149 Zedillo came to the
presidency as a Yale-trained economist, who had never held an
elected position. 150 Zedillo's inexperience suggested that he might
be incapable of implementing his policies. Furthermore, it
indicates that he might not be strong enough to handle such a large
bureaucracy, let alone his own party's entrenched members. 151
Despite much criticism, his chief political rival, former PAN
presidential candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos expressed
optimism for Mexico's future democracy. 152 De Cevallos stated,
"Zedillo's arrival in the presidency without question gave rise to
hopes that we could begin to fix the various problems in the
political and economic life of this country."'1 53 De Cevallos'
opinion about President Zedillo's desire to reform the political
system was soon backed by the President's promise to institute
direct elections for the Mayor of Mexico City. 154
President Zedillo instructed the Mayor of Mexico City, Oscar
Espinosa Villarreal, to gather all interested political parties to
begin discussions on the possibility of making the mayoral office
an elected one. 155 On December 19, 1994, five major political
parties, the PRI, PAN, PRD, the Workers Party (PT) and the
Green Party convened at the historic Castillo de Chapdiltepec. 156

14& See DePalma, supra note 131, at A16.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Tod Robberson, Mexico's Year Of Living Chaotically, THE WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1995, at A36.
153. See id.
154. See Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [Official Daily of the Federation] of May 31,
1995, at 29 [hereinafter D.O. May 31].
155. See Comisi6n Plural Ejecutiva de la Reforma Politica para el Distrito Federal,
Sintesis de la primeraetapa, (Jan.-June 1995), at 2 [hereinafter Commission Report].
156. Interview with Lic. Jorge Schiaffino Isunza, Technical Secretary of the
Commission for Mayoral Elections in Mexico City, Mexico (Feb. 6, 1996) [hereinafter
Isunza Interview].
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There, they formed a committee to submit a proposal to the
President and to Congress. 157 The unprecedented proposal was to
elect the mayor of Mexico City. Never in Mexico's history had
political parties convened to propose a constitutional amendment
to elect an official. 158 Traditionally, the President would propose
an amendment and change the constitution without opposition
159 This meeting proved historic for democracy in Mexico
support.
60
City.'

c. Negotiating Reform
Those involved with the reform proposed an amendment that
would require the election of Mexico City's mayor for the first
time in decades. This final guarantee came through the work of
the Commission established in December 1994.161

On their

agenda, President Zedillo instructed the parties to detail a list of
important elements for the Commission to discuss. 162 These
elements would then be used to draft the final reform that would
be presented to the President, the mayor of Mexico City, the
163
Federal District's Assembly of Representatives, and Congress.
Initial discussions over reform began with former President
Salinas' proposal to select the mayor from a list prepared by the
Assembly of Representatives. 164 This reform proposed that the
mayor should be selected indirectly by the President, maintaining
the status quo. Members of the opposition parties, however,
preferred a reform to elect the mayor directly by popular vote. 165
On November 8, 1995, the Commission decided that there would
be direct elections for mayor, with the title of Jefe de Gobierno. 166
The PRI proposed that the election date be set for the second
Sunday of August 1997 to coincide with federal elections. 167

157. See id,
158. See id.
159. See Vargas, supra note 44, at 506.
160. See Isunza Interview, supra note 156.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Alcocer, supra note 126.
165. See Comisi6n PluralEjecutiva, Presentaci6nComparativade los Documentos Que
Fijan Las Posiciones de Los Partidos, En Relaci6n a Los Puntos 1 Y 2 De La Agenda,
(Nov. 8, 1995) [hereinafter PartyAgenda].
166. See id.
167. See id.
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The Commission brought together four political parties, the
PRD, the PRI, the PAN and the PT, to lay out the framework for
the future of Mexico City's political structure. 168 Although many
issues were unresolved, the promise of elections for mayor of
Mexico City in the summer of 1997 remained. The commitment
from both opposition and the ruling party resulted in this reform.
Jorge Schiaffino Isunza, Technical Secretary of the Commission,
stated that the results of the Commission provided a rich
experience for the future of Mexico and the future of
democracy,
169
even though his party may be threatened in the polls.
d. PresidentZedillo's ConstitutionalAmendment and the Results
After eighteen months of negotiations among the members of
the Commission, President Zedillo sent his Reform Initiative to
Congress on July 1996.170 Among many other changes to the
Constitution, the popular election of Mexico City's mayor was the
main issue. 171 Many analysts believed this measure would never
become a reality. 172 To the surprise of many, PRI party President
Santiago Onate "indicated that the PRI must support reform or
die." 173 As required by article 135, the majority of PRI Congress
and state legislatures, formally ratified the amendment. 174 With an
overwhelming vote, President Zedillo amended the Constitution
for the second time during his term. 175 This reform package
resulted in the President formally relinquishing his power to
appoint the mayor of Mexico City. On July 6, 1997, for the first
time since 1928, the citizens exercised their democratic rights to

168. See generally Commission Report, supra note 155.
169. See Isunza Interview, supra note 156.
170. See Mark Fineman, In Mexico, a Giant Leap Toward Vote Reform Elections:
Initiative would dilute ruling party's power and allow expatriates to go to ballot box, L.A.
TIMES, July 27, 1996, at Al.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Article 122 was revised to include the elections of Mexico City's mayor. The final
amendment appeared on the Constitution as of August 22, 1996. It provides that the
mayor of the Federal District (Mexico City) will have as his duties the Executive and
public administration within one entity and fall in one person, elected by universal vote,
free, direct, and secret. See Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n of Aug. 22, 1996, at 8
[hereinafter D.O. Aug. 22].
175. Zedillo's first amendment was the Judicial reform. See Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6nof Dec. 31, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter D.0. Dec. 31.].
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C. Applying ConstitutionalTheories to Mexico City's Reform
1. The Amendment Process from the American Perspective
Bruce Ackerman explains the amendment process as a
constitutional reflection of politics or a constitutional moment.
The first constitutional moment is evidenced by Zedillo's changes
to twenty-seven articles in his first reform initiative. 177 The second
moment was the reform initiative to elect the mayor during the
summer of 1995.178
Ackerman identified higher lawmaking as an approach to
explain the amendment process. A higher lawmaking system
encompasses a series of stages which, if met, render an amendment
unnecessary. 179 The four stages consist of (1) the signaling phase,
(2) the proposal stage, (3) the period of mobilized popular
deliberation stage and (4) the legal codification stage. 180 The
amendment to elect the mayor followed these stages.
Mexico City's amendment does follow Bruce Ackerman's
higher lawmaking theory. President Zedillo informed the public
that an amendment would be proposed and implemented. 181 This
public statement signaled Zedillo's commitment to amending the
constitution to the opposition parties. Ackerman's proposal stage
was met when Zedillo ordered the mayor of Mexico City to gather
1 82
key members of the opposition parties to draft an amendment.
A period of mobilized popular deliberation stage was evidenced by
the 1993 plebiscite vote and public discussions over the
amendment. 183 Finally, legal codification was fulfilled when
Congress and state legislatures approved the amendment and
added it to the Constitution. 1 84 While Ackerman defines legal
codification as statutes and laws, legal codification in Mexico is a
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constitutional change. 18 5 When all four stages are met, Ackerman
argues that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary.
In
Mexico's experience, all four stages were met and an amendment
was proposed and implemented.
Another approach to explain the amending process is through
court interpretation. John Vile describes how the U.S. Supreme
Court implicitly makes changes to the Constitution. 186 While
Supreme Court decisions in the United States affect the
Constitution, Mexico's Supreme Court does not have the same
profound impact in constitutional politics. "Mexicans do not
perceive the Supreme Court of Mexico as a judicial institution
having the power to influence social, political and economic forces.
187
Mexico has never had a decision like Marbury v. Madison."
Moreover, Mexico's Supreme Court structure prevents it from
prescribing implicit constitutional changes in Mexico.
In the recent constitutional amendment to elect the Mayor of
Mexico City, Mexico's Supreme Court had no role in the
amending process. Rather, the President and the opposition
parties initiated the process with a final vote by the legislative
branch. 188 These segments of Mexico's political system have a
substantially larger impact on Mexico's society than does the
Mexican Supreme Court. "Decisions of the Supreme Court have
not touched an infinite number of areas." 189 Because of its weak
position and lack of influence, the Mexican Supreme Court is
1 90
relegated to follow the President's decisions.
2. The Amending Process from the Mexican Perspective
Jorge Vargas's programmatic content approach details one
theory in
Mexican constitutional
amendment process.
Amendments in Mexico are inserted by the president's six-year
plan. The amendment to elect the mayor for Mexico City,
however, was not part of the six-year plan. Rather, it was granted
months after Zedillo's National Development Plan was presented

185. See Vargas, supra note 44, at 498.
186. See CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 36.
187. See Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal
of President Zedillo's JudicialReform of 1995, 11 A.M. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 295, 335
(1996) [hereinafter The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico].
188. See Fineman, supra note 170.
189. See The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 187.
190. See id. at 297-98.
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to the people. 191 Nonetheless, the amendment reflects the
president's tradition to implement his political platform by
changing the Constitution.
By conceding to the opposition's demand for a democratic
government in Mexico City, Zedillo did not conform to
maintaining the status quo for which his predecessors fought.
President Zedillo "succeeded in reducing the powers of the
presidency, of liberalizing Mexican politics further, and of creating
192
a broader space for the development of competitive politics."
Zedillo's actions fundamentally broke away from the tradition of
implementing changes to the Constitution to benefit the
presidency and the ruling party. 193 This amendment represented
Zedillo's commitment to reform and the agenda of the opposition.
Another theory that may shed some light on the significance
of this amendment is Jaime Gracia's theory of presidentialism.
This theory explains the President's immense powers over the
amendment process. By controlling the actors of the amendment
process, such as the Mexican Congress and the state legislatures,
the President may seemingly change the Constitution at will. 194
This practice is commonly used to assure that the president and
195
the ruling party retain power.
Determined to grant direct elections, President Zedillo easily
introduced the amendment to Congress and to the state
legislatures. 196 Congress and the state legislatures ratified the
amendment to elect the Mayor as requested by President Zedillo.
In support of their president, PRI governors quickly approved the
amendment. 197 The ease of amending the constitution supports
This amendment, however,
the concept of presidentialism.
undermines the president's power. President Zedillo used his
power over the amendment process to undermine his own
If he is truly committed to further
presidential powers.
democratization, Zedillo may propose other amendments that will
Such constitutional amendments may
alter his powers.
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significantly undermine the notion of presidentialism in Mexico.
IV. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER FOR MEXICO
A. Amendment of 1995: A Changefrom the Past
Although the Amendment of 1995 may comply with
traditional norms of implementing constitutional changes in
Mexico, the process in achieving this amendment establishes a new
order. Prior amendments were simply policies and economic
changes made by the President in accordance with his and the
PRI's political agenda. 198 De la Madrid and Salinas attempted to
guarantee democracy, but they could not deliver on their promises.
Mexico's political tradition in amending the Constitution served to
increase, or at least maintain the President's power.
This
amendment, however, broke with tradition. For the first time in
Mexican history, a constitutional amendment guaranteed
democracy as seen through direct elections. 199
After decades of demanding reform, an amendment was
finally promised and guaranteed. What was so different during the
last three years that compelled the government and the PRI
leadership to decide to amend the constitution? Why did this not
occur earlier, in 1986 or 1993? A central cause for the success of
reform under President Zedillo is the negative image surrounding
the ruling party.200 Their tarnished reputation facilitated Mexico's
move towards democracy as Mexico saw corruption and a crisis
20 1
befall its political system.
Times have changed in Mexico since the last attempts to
restore elections to Mexico City by amendment. Between 1982
and 1986, former President de la Madrid promised elections in
Mexico City in hopes of gaining support for his economic plans. 20 2
Similarly, President Salinas, facing an economic crisis as he
assumed power, promised an amendment for elections to solve
Mexico's problems. 20 3 By contrast, under President Zedillo and

198. See Vargas, supra note 44.
199. See D.O. Aug. 22, supra note 174.
200. Interview by written correspondence with Dolores Padierna Luna, Assembly
Representative for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and PRD's
Coordinator for Mexico City, in Mexico City, Mexico (Feb. 26,1996).
201. See id.
202. See DAVIS, supra note 80, at 262.
203. See Scott, supra note 125, at 22.

1999]

The Rise of Democracy in Mexico City

155

the PRI leadership, an amendment was supported and ratified by a
PRI-controlled Congress. Conditions, like population growth and
civic participation in Mexico City, demonstrated the need for
permanent change in the 1990s. Such was not the case in the
204
1980s.
Clearly, a difference between the promise to amend and the
guarantee to amend is the political nightmare that challenged the
government in recent years. De la Madrid and Salinas did not face
political assassinations, widespread corruption, and a civilian
uprising that threatened the Mexican government for over sixtyfive years. 20 5 An open and threatened political system forced the
ruling party to work with the opposition and pass an amendment
20 6
granting direct elections for the Mayor of Mexico City.
Confronting a weak political system, Zedillo did not respond
to the demands of his party, but rather, to the citizens of Mexico
City and the opposition. 20 7 Zedillo made it his objective to break
away "with the decades-long tradition of presidential
dominance." 20 8 His commitment to legitimize the opposition's
hopes for elections through amendment constitutes a huge step
towards a new constitutional order for Mexico's future democracy.
For the first time since the adoption of the Constitution of 1917,
the President invited political parties to propose an amendment to
grant a democratic right -the exercise of elections.
B. A New ConstitutionalWay of EnsuringDemocracy in Mexico
Mexicans learned a valuable lesson from this unique
experience. To ensure democracy in Mexico, it is necessary to
change the Constitution. Over the years, Mexican presidents have
promised direct elections for Mexico City's mayor.
These
promises, however, have fallen short to political pressures to
maintain the status quo. When President Zedillo called for a
committee to propose a reform, there was some assurance that
Zedillo was committed to granting elections. 20 9 After months of
negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition,

204. See Isunza Interview, supra note 156.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Michael Elliott & Tim Padgett, 'I have great confidence.' (Mexican President
Ernesto Zedillo), NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 14496834.
208. Rubio, supra note 192, at 14.
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Congress modified the Mexican Constitution to provide for free
elections. Democracy returned to Mexico City because the
amended Constitution, legitimized this right.
The threats that challenged the government forced President
Zedillo to amend the Constitution. The opposition discussed and
negotiated with the PRI for an amendment. For the first time
since democracy was eliminated in Mexico City after the
Revolution of 1910, the ruling party welcomed reform and was
committed to amend the Constitution.
To implement democratic reform and to amend the
constitution, the government must face a challenge that threatens
its authority. The opposition must exert serious pressures to the
political system and gain the President's commitment to bring
about change. Full democratic reform, such as a constitutional
amendment to guarantee elections, is likely only when the political
scene faces a strong threat from the people and the opposition. In
demanding further democracy throughout Mexico, reformers must
learn from the experience of Mexico City and continue to
challenge the government.
V. CONCLUSION

Many scholars perceive a constitution to be the ultimate will
of a nation. For Mexico, the Constitution of 1917 embraces the
nation's vigorous history and political traditions. Furthermore,
Mexico has seemingly followed Thomas Jefferson's vision of the
constitutional amendment process; a constitution should be
210
changed frequently to reflect the changes within the nation.
Since 1917, some 300 changes to the Mexican Constitution have
been made. Traditionally, the President of Mexico amends the
constitution to maintain or increase his political powers. These
frequent amendments, however, may not reflect the will of the
nation. In order to uphold the true meaning of Mexico's
constitution-a document for its people-such changes should not
represent the President's will. Rather, profound changes to the
political system must reflect the will of the people.
Reaching a successful and peaceful transition to democracy in
Mexico City demonstrates the changing role of the Mexican
government. The ruling party has given initial indications that it

210. See CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS, supra note 7, at 74.
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had the will to face a challenge and to provide a solution. While
Mexicans demanded change, the government made a promise to
the Mexican people.
Although achieving free elections
represented a great challenge, a greater challenge awaits Mexico.
Now that tht opposition won, the PRI and the Mexican
government must accept the outcome and relinquish its power
without denying rights to the newly elected mayor, Cuauhtemoc
Cirdenas. Given the importance of this city, Cirdenas has many
challenges ahead of him. For the time being, the citizens of the
largest city in the world enjoy the freedoms of democracy.
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